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Concept of Earth's Shape - 1
Abstract
This paper presents the results of an experiment which investigated elementary school children's
concept of the earth's shape and the related concept of gravity. First, third, and fifth grade children
were asked a series of factual, explanatory, and generative questions in an attempt to understand as
clearly as possible the way they conceptualized the shape of the earth. An examination of the
responses of individual children to these questions revealed considerable surface inconsistency. For
example, many children said that the earth is round but at the same time stated that it has an edge and
that people could fall down from that edge. A great deal of this apparent inconsistency could be
explained by assuming that the children had formed and used in a consistent fashion various
assimilatory concepts of the earth's shape, for example, that the earth is a disc, that there are two
earths, one round and one flat, and that the earth is a sphere but people live on flat ground inside the
sphere. We argue that children construct these assimilatory concepts in an effort to reconcile the
information coming from adults that the earth is a sphere with a naive concept of a flat earth. We
further interpret the presence of assimilatory models to support the hypothesis that children's concept
of the earth is embedded within certain naive ontological and epistemological theories and that
changing this concept requires a change of theory analogous in many respects to theory change in the
history of science.
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THE CONCEPT OF THE EARTH'S SHAPE:
A STUDY OF CONCEPTUAL CHANGE IN CHILDHOOD
A well-known scientist (some say it was Bertrand Russell) once gave a public lecture
on astronomy. He described how the earth orbits around the sun and how the sun, in
turn, orbits around the center of a vast collection of stars called our galaxy. At the
end of the lecture, a little old lady at the back of the room got up and said: "What you
have told us is rubbish. The world is really a flat plate supported on the back of a
giant tortoise." The scientist gave a superior smile before replying, "What is the
tortoise standing on?" "You're very clever, young man, very clever," said the old lady.
"But it's turtles all the way down!" (S. Hawking, A brief history of time, 1988, p.1)
In most societies, the earliest conceptions about the earth were that it is flat, motionless, and that it is
the center of the universe (Kuhn, 1957; Lambert, 1975; Toulmin & Goodfield, 1961). This leads to the
possibility that young children may also initially adopt a flat earth position. It took science more than
2,000 years to settle on the current view of the earth as a sphere that spins on its axis and revolves
around the sun. Thus, if children do adopt a flat earth position, they may also find it difficult to change
from a flat earth to a spherical earth concept. The purpose of the study reported in this paper is to
investigate children's concept of the earth's shape and to understand how this concept changes as
children become exposed to the currently accepted model during the elementary school years.
The questions of how concepts are structured and how these structures change are fundamental for a
theory of cognitive development. For a long time research about conceptual change was dominated by
the view that concepts consist of necessary and sufficient features and that conceptual development is
characterized by sequences of global representational shifts (i.e., stages). According to this view
children start the knowledge acquisition process by forming concrete, instance-bound representations
based on similarity to particular examples. Developments in children's logical capabilities allow them
to move from these "pseudoconcepts" to form "real" concepts based on class inclusion and hierarchical
classification (e.g., Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956; Piaget, 1962; Vygotsky, 1934/1986).
Criticisms of the Traditional View
Both the structural and developmental aspects of this theory of conceptual change have been severely
criticized. We will focus here on two areas of criticism both of which have served to narrow the
hypothesized differences between children and adults.
First, the notion that children go through sequences of stages has been attacked both on theoretical
and empirical grounds (e.g., Carey, 1985; Fodor, 1972; Gelman & Gallistel, 1978; Mandler, 1983;
Rozin, 1976). It has now become clear that, although preschool children may have difficulty with
Piagetian class-inclusion tasks, they are able to form consistent and exhaustive classes from an early
age in some cases (e.g., Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976; Ross, 1980; Sugarman,
1983). Some researchers have accounted for stage-like changes not in terms of global shifts but in
terms of domain-specific shifts where the structure underlying particular stages may differ from one
domain to another and where stage transitions may occur at different ages depending on the domain
(e.g., Keil, 1986).
Serious problems have also been found with the notion that concepts are organized around necessary
and sufficient features (Smith & Medin, 1981). Research has suggested that many concepts can be
characterized only in terms of typical or characteristic features based on similarity to particular
exemplars, regardless of whether they are formed by children or adults (e.g., Rosch & Mervis, 1975;
Smith & Medin, 1981). However, in recent years researchers have become increasingly aware that
similarity alone is not sufficient to provide an account of conceptional coherence and that concepts
should not be viewed as consisting of a collection of independent attributes but of attributes embedded
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in larger theoretical structures and as deriving their coherence and consistency from these theories
(e.g., Medin, Wattenmaker, & Hampson, 1987; Murphy & Medin, 1985; see also the chapters on
Similarity in Vosniadou & Ortony, in press).
Some of these same points have also been made by schema theorists (Brewer & Nakamura, 1984;
Rumelhart, 1980). However, we will not use the schema framework and terminology in this paper
because the term "schema" has frequently been associated with static knowledge representations which
do not have the explanatory power of a theory (e.g., Abelson, 1981; Nelson, 1978).
The view that concepts are embedded in theories has found support in developmental psychology,
cognitive science, and science education (e.g., Carey, 1985; Collins & Stevens, 1984; Driver & Easley,
1978; Keil, 1986; McCloskey, 1983; Osborne & Wittrock, 1983). For example, in her studies of the
development of children's biological concepts such as "animal" and "living," Carey (1985) found that the
younger children organized the properties of animals in a different way than the older children, but that
even the youngest children in her sample (4-year-olds) showed evidence of using some biological
knowledge to constrain their categorization. For example, the 4-year-old children said that a worm was
more likely than a toy monkey to have a spleen (described as a green thing inside people) despite the
fact that they thought that a toy monkey was more similar to people than a worm. The children showed
in this way that they could differentiate surface similarity from category membership (see also Gelman
& Markman, 1986; Vosniadou, in press; Vosniadou & Ortony, 1983).
Typically children's or novices' theories are rather different from the theories held by scientifically
literate adults in our society and seem to be resistant to change. For example, in the domain of light
many children believe that eyes perceive objects directly and that color is a property of the objects
themselves (Anderson & Smith, 1986). Some novices in the area of electricity think that a switch is like
the trigger of a gun. It sends an impulse to a battery to trigger current flow from the battery to a light
bulb (Collins & Stevens, 1984). Sometimes novices' theories are found to resemble earlier theories in
the history of science. For example, Clement (1982) and McCloskey (1983) argue that adult novices in
mechanics hold a systematic conception of motion which bears a striking resemblance to a pre-
Newtonian theory known as impetus theory. Brewer and Samarapungavan (in press) have also
defended the position that children develop theories that share many properties of scientific theories.
Although the notion that concepts are embedded in theories has acquired increased acceptance (see
Neisser, 1987), it has raised a whole new set of questions. What is the nature of these theories, where
do they come from, and how do they change?
According to Keil (1986) children are born with certain structural constraints which allow them to
induce theories (see also Keil & Kelly, 1986). Initially these theories consist of some skeletal but
principled distinctions at the ontological level. Ontological knowledge becomes more differentiated
and hierarchically integrated as children become older (see Keil, 1979; 1983). Similar approaches to
the problem of conceptual change in terms of the increasing differentiation and hierarchical integration
of existing structures are common in the expert/novice literature (e.g., Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981;
Larkin, 1981).
Carey (1985; 1986) has called this type of conceptual change "weak restructuring" to distinguish it from
a different kind of conceptual change which she calls "radical restructuring." According to Carey (1986)
children start with two theories (e.g., an intuitive physics embodying physical causality and an intuitive
psychology embodying intentional causality) from which new theories emerge, in ways analogous to
radical theory change in the history of science (e.g., Hanson, 1958; Kuhn, 1970, 1977). This domain-
specific radical restructuring is conceptualized either in terms of the separation of a new theoretical
domain from a parent theory (e.g., the separation of biology from psychology), or in terms of theory
change (e.g., the change from an impetus theory of motion to a Newtonian theory). In all of these
cases, the new theory is different from the previous one in its structure, in the domain of the
phenomena it explains, and in its individual concepts (Carey, 1985).
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As we have discussed in an earlier paper (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1987), the distinction between weak
and radical restructuring is an important one both because it captures the real difficulties students have
in mastering some domains of knowledge (e.g., Newtonian mechanics), and because it has interesting
theoretical implications for the areas of cognitive development and knowledge acquisition. The
possibility of radical restructuring limits the number of concepts a theory of conceptual development
must assume are innate and thus reduces some of the difficulty in understanding how children acquire
new concepts (e.g., Fodor, 1980). The position that children begin with a few theory-like structures
from which new, qualitatively different, knowledge structures emerge (Carey, 1985) depends crucially
on the assumption that the process of knowledge acquisition is characterized by radical rather than
weak restructurings. The notion of radical restructuring also raises important questions about the
methods and content of instruction. It is possible that different methods of instruction are needed
when the new knowledge to be taught requires a major restructuring of what is already known than
when it does not.
The view that children's and novices' intuitive knowledge can be characterized as a theory and that
conceptual change involves theory change is not without its critics. In a recent paper, diSessa (1988)
has argued that intuitive physics is nothing but a fragmented collection of ideas which are loosely
connected and do not have the systematicity that one attributes to a scientific theory. Solomon (1983)
has made similar arguments. (See Brewer & Samarapungavan, in press, for a critique of this position.)
At present, many questions remain unanswered about the exact nature of the theories held by children
or adult novices and the way these theories differ from scientific theories. Even if we assume that
children have theories, there has not been convincing evidence so far that these theories become
radically restructured in the course of development and knowledge acquisition. In order for these
questions to be answered we need detailed descriptions of the knowledge acquisition process in a
number of specific domains. The present study was undertaken in that context.
Theoretical Framework
Global and Domain-Specific Theories
In this section we will present a brief outline of our theoretical framework which will be described in
greater detail in Vosniadou (in preparation). Central to this theoretical framework is a distinction
between two kinds of "theories." As many philosophers of science have observed, the term "scientific
theory" has been used to refer to at least two very different types of things: (a) a specific set of
hypotheses or principles which can be utilized in making experimental predictions (such as Maxwell's
theory of electromagnetism, Gallileo's theory of the tides, or Freud's theory of the unconscious) and
(b) the much more fundamental, less easily testable sets of assumptions that have been referred to as
paradigms (Kuhn, 1962), disciplinary matrix (Kuhn, 1970), ideals of natural order (Toulmin, 1961),
collective ideals (Toulmin, 1972), research programs (Lakatos, 1970) and research traditions (Laudan,
1977). In the second, more fundamental use the term scientific theory refers to an entire family of
doctrines (such as the theory of evolution or the atomic theory), which include common ontological
assumptions and criteria for what constitutes a scientific theory.
When it comes to characterizing children's or novices' conceptual knowledge we propose drawing a
distinction between "domain-specific theories" and "global theories" that is analogous, in some respects,
to the one made in the philosophy of science. Both global and domain-specific theories embody a set
of interrelated concepts that can explain a certain class of phenomena. The two kinds of theories
differ, however, both in their generality and in their relation to each other. Global theories are more
general than domain-specific theories in that they can generate hypotheses which can apply to many
domains of enquiry, while domain-specific theories can explain only a limited class of phenomena. In
addition, domain-specific theories are embedded within the global theories which constrain them.
Concepts are embedded within both global and domain-specific theories.
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The term "domain" is used roughly to refer to the various scientific disciplines as currently understood
(e.g., physics, biology, economics, psychology, etc.). As conceptual knowledge becomes more complex,
domains can be divided into subdomains and individual concepts can be elevated to domain theories.
The notion we want to convey here is that of a hierarchy of nested structures from the more general
(global theories) to the more simple (concepts).
Conceptual Change
We assume that children start the knowledge acquisition process with one or few global theories
consisting of a set of core concepts and a notion of causality (see Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976) which
form the basis of their ontology and epistemology (their beliefs in the kinds of things that exist and in
the nature of knowledge). Domain-specific theories emerge out of these global theories but are not
limited by them. The development of a domain-specific theory can have implications which may cause
the eventual restructuring of a global theory.
Conceptual change is assumed to involve both "weak" and "radical" restructurings. In most cases,
individuals use information from observation or instruction to enrich existing conceptual structures.
Occasionally, they may be faced with major anomalies that require radical theory changes. In this
paper we will use the term "theory articulation" to refer to the kinds of changes that require the
differentiation or hierarchical integration of existing structures (i.e., "weak" restructuring), and the term
"theory restructuring" to refer to changes in explanatory framework (i.e., as "radical" restructuring).
Theory articulation and restructuring can occur both at the level of domain-specific and global theories.
Theory Restructuring
Following Carey (1985) and her colleagues (Wiser & Carey, 1983) we assume that theory restructuring
involves the replacement of a theory with a new theory different from the old one: (a) in its structure,
(b) in its individual concepts, and (c) in the domain of phenomena it explains. In addition, radical
restructuring at the level of a domain-specific theory usually involves the rejection of some fundamental
beliefs associated with the global theory.
The rejection of deep beliefs associated with a global theory is a common characteristic of theory
restructuring in the history of science. Revolutionary changes in the history of science have frequently
involved the rejection of some fundamental beliefs dictated by the scientific paradigm or research
program within which a domain-specific theory was conceptualized. For example, the Copernican
revolution required giving up the belief that the earth stood in the center of the universe. Kepler's
theory of planetary mechanics was based on the rejection of the belief that circular motion was the
most perfect kind of motion. Newton's theory required the rejection of the belief in a static universe
(e.g., Berry, 1961; Toulmin & Goodfield, 1961). Fundamental beliefs of that kind form the background
assumptions within which scientific investigations take place and are very hard to change because they
are not easily subjected to empirical testing. We think that the radical restructuring of an individual's
structures can be conceptualized in a similar way. That is, as a conceptual change which involves the
rejection of some of the individual's fundamental ontological and epistemological beliefs which
constrain domain-specific theories and concepts. These types of changes can bring about the eventual
restructuring of a global theory.
Theory restructuring at the level of a global theory requires replacing a global theory with a new one.
This type of theory change requires the rejection of most of the fundamental assumptions of the old
global theory. The restructuring of a global theory can affect more than one domain-specific theory in
ways analogous to those described by Kuhn's (1962) paradigm shifts or Piaget's (1929) stages. This
type of theory restructuring is different, however, from Piaget's stages because it does not derive from
changes in the child's logical machinery, but from the adoption of a new explanatory framework.
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Concepts, domain specific theories, and global theories constitute the structural component of a theory
of conceptual change. This structural component needs to be distinguished from a procedural
component which specifies how conceptual knowledge is used to solve problems, answer questions, or
understand text. Fundamental to our view of how the human conceptual system operates is the
construct of the mental model (Gentner & Stevens, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 1983). The term mental
model has been used in a number of different ways (e.g., Brewer, 1987). The term is used here to refer
to a particular mental representation constructed to deal with a specific problem. This form of
representation differs from other types of mental representations in that its structure is assumed to "be
identical to the structure of the states of affairs (perceived or conceived) that it represents" (Johnson-
Laird, 1983, p. 419).
Mental models are assumed to be synthetic and dynamic structures which are generated from people's
concepts and reflect the global and domain-specific theories within which these concepts are
embedded. In the early stages of knowledge acquisition individuals have not yet constructed theories
specific to different domains. Their concepts are embedded within global theories and the mental
models they use are constructed out of these global theories. In the process of knowledge acquisition
domain-specific theories emerge out of global theories and become continuously articulated and/or
restructured. Domain-specific theories affect the structure of the individual concepts which comprise
them and as a result give rise to different mental models during problem solving. For that reason,
understanding the mental models individuals use to answer questions or solve problems can provide
important information about underlying conceptual structure.
In this paper we explore the implications of this theoretical framework in a study of the development of
children's concept of the earth's shape and the related notion of gravity. This study was undertaken in
the context of a larger project investigating knowledge acquisition in the domain of observational
astronomy. The purpose of the project is to understand the nature of children's initial conceptual
knowledge about the earth, sun, moon and stars and to understand how this knowledge changes with
exposure to the Copernican model during the elementary school years.
The Domain of Observational Astronomy
The domain of observational astronomy was chosen because it is a relatively rich domain composed of
a number of concepts and their interconnections. It is therefore a domain where there is the potential
for developing rich domain-specific theories. In addition to its richness, many of the phenomena which
a theory of observational astronomy accounts for (e.g., the shape, size, movement, and position of the
earth, sun and the moon, the day/night cycle, the phases of the moon, etc.) are accessible to young
children. In other words, children's everyday experience provides them with enough information for
constructing an intuitive understanding of such phenomena. Finally, the domain of astronomy has
undergone a number of restructurings in its historical development (Kuhn, 1957, 1970; Toulmin &
Goodfield, 1961). We thought that by selecting a domain which has undergone radical restructuring in
its historical development we maximized our chances of finding similar restructurings in children
acquiring knowledge in this domain.
The concept of the earth's shape is a core concept in a theory of astronomy and has been associated
with a number of revolutions in the history of this science. The earliest conceptions about the earth
were that it is flat and that it stands in the center of the universe. The earth was hypothesized to be flat
in early Egypt (Kuhn, 1957; Plumley, 1985) in Sumeria (Lambert, 1975), in early Greece (Toulmin &
Goodfield, 1961) and in early India (Gombrich, 1975).
In the historical development of cosmological theories the view that the earth is flat was eventually
replaced by the view that it is a sphere. Aristotle in his book On the heavens offered a number of
arguments as to why the earth should be a sphere. One of the arguments has to do with the position of
the North Star. The Greeks knew from their travels that the North Star appears lower in the sky when
viewed in the south than in the north, a change of location which is difficult to explain if we assume that
Vosniadou & Brewer
Concept of Earth's Shape - 7
the earth is flat. Another argument was based on an explanation of the eclipses of the moon. Aristotle
hypothesized that the eclipses of the moon were caused by the earth's shadow on the moon. Since this
shadow was always round, he argued that the earth must be spherical.
The view that the earth is a sphere was fully elaborated by Ptolemy in his Almagest. According to
Ptolemy, the earth was a sphere which stood motionless at the center of the universe. It was
surrounded by eight spheres on which the sun, moon, five planets known at the time, and the stars were
attached. The sun, moon and planets moved around the earth in orbits that were perfect circles. The
stars were attached on the outermost sphere which also rotated around the earth with all the stars fixed
on it. The Copernican revolution retained the view that the earth is a sphere but required a shift from
a geocentric to a heliocentric universe and with it the rejection of the belief that the earth does not
move.
In the present study we focused only on the changes in children's concept of the earth's shape.
Changes in the concepts of the earth's motion, location, and size and the relationship of the earth with
the sun, moon, stars and planets will be reported in later reports from our studies of knowledge
acquisition in astronomy.
Children's Ideas About the Earth's Shape
We hypothesized that children, like the early astronomers, would start with the "common sense" view
that the earth is flat, and that objects fall from up to down within this plane. This hypothesis was based
on the observation that children share similar experiences with the early astronomers and because they
are at a similar stage of theory formation, that is, they do not have a domain-specific theory of
astronomy (McCloskey & Kargon, 1988).
Several studies of children's notions of the earth's shape (Nussbaum, 1979; Nussbaum & Novak, 1976;
Sneider & Pulos, 1983) have confirmed this hypothesis. Although many children at this age say that the
earth is round when asked, under more detailed questioning, ("Where does the sun go at night?" "What
does the earth look like when you look at it from very far away?") give answers consistent with a flat
earth view.
Unlike the early astronomers, children do not have to discover for themselves that the earth is a
sphere. If we assume that children start with a flat earth concept, do they find it difficult to change to a
round earth concept when they are told that the earth is a sphere?
The view of the earth as a sphere is counter-intuitive and contradicts a number of important
ontological beliefs, such as the belief that the ground is flat and that things fall down. Indeed, the view
that the earth is a sphere was often attacked by proponents of the flat earth view on the grounds that
people on the other side of the spherical earth would fall off (Kuhn, 1957, p. 108). Because children
lack the observational data which made it reasonable for the early astronomers to adopt the view that
the earth is a sphere, it makes sense to assume that the information that the earth is a sphere would be
difficult to understand.
There is some evidence which supports the hypothesis that the shift from a flat to a round earth
concept is a difficult one to make and that in the process of making this shift children form various
misconceptions regarding the earth's shape. For example, Nussbaum and Novak (1976) in an interview
study of 26 second grade children discovered that children held five "notions" about the earth which
differed in interesting ways from the adult scientific beliefs. Notion 1 included the children who said
that the earth is round but answered all other questions as if they believed that the earth is really flat.
Notion 2 was ascribed to the children who thought that the earth is round like a ball but lacked the idea
of "unlimited space." These children thought that there is ground or ocean underneath the earth. The
children who held Notion 3 lacked the idea of gravity. They believed that objects at the bottom of the
earth would fall down into space. The children who held Notion 4 knew that objects at the bottom of
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the earth do not fall in space but did not quite understand that gravity operates by pulling things toward
the center of the earth. Finally, the children who held Notion 5 provided the accepted responses to the
earth shape and gravity questions.
Nussbaum (1979) further tested the validity of these notions in a developmental study involving Israeli
children. Five groups of 48 children from grades 4 to 8 were interviewed using a multiple-choice
questionnaire on their earth shape and gravity concepts. The results suggested that Notions 1 and 2
should be combined and also uncovered a new notion, according to which the earth was like a huge ball
consisting of two hemispheres: an upper hemisphere made up of "air" or "sky" and a lower hemisphere
consisting of the ground where people live.
These results were further validated in a study by Sneider and Pulos (1983) in which 159 children from
grades 3 through 8 were administered a structured interview based on a slight modification of the
Nussbaum and Novak (1976) questionnaire. Sneider and Pulos concluded that most of the children in
their sample who were below 10 years of age (grades 3 and 4) held Notions 1, 2, or 3, that most of the
children aged 13 and over held Notions 4 and 5, and that the widest spread of notions was found among
11- and 12-year-olds.
Finally, Mali and Howe (1979) investigated the development of the earth shape and gravity concepts
among Nepali children coming from both an urban and a rural region. They mention that in Nepal the
traditional belief of adults who have had no schooling is that the Earth is a flat mass supported on four
corners by an enormous elephant. However, the children are taught that the Earth is a sphere in the
elementary school. Mali and Howe tested 250 children ages 8, 10 and 12 with tasks similar to those
used by Nussbaum and Novak (1976). They report that the Nepali children showed earth shape
concepts similar to the American children but that they tended to occur at later ages.
These studies raise difficult problems for a theory that assumes that "flat" is simply a feature of the
concept earth. They also pose problems for a "weak restructuring" view to the problem of conceptual
change (Chi, in press). Chi has argued that when new knowledge about a concept is introduced by
adults in a school setting it is stored as a separate microstructure and is not related to the experientially
derived knowledge about the same concept. These two microstructures remain unconnected and
information from them is used to answer different kinds of questions. Such a model could indeed
explain why children say that the earth is round when asked "What is the shape of the earth?" but
answer the other questions as if they believed that the earth is flat. It cannot, however, account for the
various alternate views regarding the earth's shape discovered by the empirical research just reviewed.
In our view, such alternate views reveal children's attempts to assimilate the information that the earth
is round coming from adults to the information that the earth is flat coming out of their ontological
theories. Piaget (1929, p. 236) reports an interesting case of such an assimilatory concept formed by a
child attempting to understand the explanation of the day/night cycle. This child had been given an
explanation of the day/night cycle in terms of the rotation of the earth; she had been told that when it
was night in Europe it was day in America. The child assimilated this information into her existing
concept by constructing a "layer cake" mental model of the earth. She developed a view that there was
a flat earth America under the flat earth Europe and that at night the sun dropped through the
European layer and illuminated the lower American layer. Notice that by constructing this view the
child succeeded in retaining both her belief that the earth is flat and the information given by adults
that when it is night in Europe it is day in America. Similarly, when children construct the view that the
earth is composed of two hemispheres and argue that people live on the flat top of the lower
hemisphere they succeed in retaining their belief that the ground is flat while they also incorporate the
adult view that the earth is round.
Still it is possible that assimilatory concepts of this sort represent transitory attempts to provide
solutions to new problems which the children have not encountered before. If this is the case then the
alternate views should be ephemeral, unsystematic, and highly influenced by the nature of the specific
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problem to which children or novices are exposed. However, if children's alternative conceptions about
the earth have their roots in children's ontological theories we should find that they are robust,
systematic, that they are used in more than one situation, and that they are difficult to change.
The empirical studies reviewed above are provocative but have not provided us with information
regarding the systematicity, consistency, and robustness of children's misconceptions about the earth's
shape. In many cases they did not even provide a description of the criteria used to identify children's
"notions." In the present experiment we wanted to find out the kinds of mental models of the earth that
children form to answer our questions and to understand whether these models are used in a stable
and consistent manner.
Methodological Issues
The basic methodology used in this study consisted of asking children questions, some of which
required a verbal response (e.g., "What is above the earth?") and others which required the children to
draw a picture (e.g., "Make a drawing of the earth so that its real shape shows"). Crucial for our
approach was the distinction between factual and generative questions. Factual questions (e.g., "What is
the shape of the earth?") provided information about children's exposure to theoretically important
facts. Children could answer these questions by simply repeating the information they had obtained
from adults. Generative questions (e.g., "Does the earth have an edge?") were designed to reveal the
mental models children used to answer questions to which they had not been exposed previously.
Children's responses to these questions revealed the extent to which the information that the earth is a
sphere had been incorporated into their underlying conceptual structures. Consider, for example, the
questions "If one were to walk for many days on a straight line would one ever reach the edge of the
earth? Does the earth have an edge?" If the children had fully understood the information that the
earth is a sphere they should be able to employ a spherical earth mental model and on the basis of that
to conclude that the earth does not have an edge and that if someone walked for many days in a
straight line, one would come back to where one started. If, however, the children had not
incorporated the information that the earth is a sphere in their conceptual structures they should
answer this question by forming a mental model of a flat earth. Based on that model they should
conclude that the earth has an edge.
In using this methodology we tried to understand, first, the kinds of mental models children
constructed to answer our individual questions, and, second, the extent to which these models derived
from a consistent underlying concept. We then tried to use this information to draw inferences about
the nature and development of children's conceptual knowledge. More specifically we explored the
hypothesis that children's concept of the earth's shape is embedded within a global theory and that
changes from a flat to a sphere earth concept can be characterized in terms of (radical) theory
restructuring.
Method
Subjects
The subjects for this study were 60 children: 20 first graders, ranging in age from 6.4 to 7.5 years
(mean age, 6.9); 20 third graders ranging in age from 9.3 to 10.3 years (mean age, 9.9); and 20 fifth
graders ranging in age from 10.3 to 11.9 years (mean age, 11.0). The children attended an elementary
school in a town in Illinois. They came from middle-class and lower middle-class backgrounds.
Approximately half of the children were girls and half were boys.
Materials
Materials consisted of a 48-item questionnaire. The questionnaire was developed through extensive
pilot work and was designed to provide information about children's knowledge of certain critical
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concepts in the domain of astronomy. Only the questions investigating children's conceptions of the
earth shape and the related notion of gravity will be discussed in this paper.
As mentioned earlier, the questionnaire contained factual questions and generative questions. In
addition, some explanation questions were included (e.g., "Why did you say that the earth is round?").
These questions were designed to provide us with information about the explanatory framework within
which children's conceptual knowledge was embedded.
Procedure
The children were seen individually in interviews which lasted between 30 to 45 min. The interview was
audio-taped but the experimenters also made detailed notes of the children's responses. The scoring
was done on the basis of both the transcribed data and the experimenters' notes.
Follow-up questions and confrontation questions were used throughout the interview when children's
responses appeared to be ambiguous or inconsistent. In order to resolve ambiguous responses the
experimenter occasionally asked children to show the earth's shape using play dough. Often, we asked
additional questions at the end of the interview in an effort to obtain as accurate a picture of children's
concept of the earth as possible.
Scoring
The scoring key contained a set of categories for each question that covered as best as possible the
range of responses obtained. For example, for the question "Can you draw a picture of the earth?", the
scoring key contained the following categories:
Don't Know; Circle; Rectangle; Circle within square frame;
Oval; Straight line but changes to circle after questioning;
Other; Missing Data.
The category "Other" was devised to characterize responses which were meaningful but unique and
could not be grouped under an existing category. The scores on each question were assigned
independently of information taken from the other questions. It is important to emphasize that we did
not try to interpret children's responses in the light of what we thought was their overall concept of the
earth (as this concept was emerging during the questioning procedure) because we did not want to
mask any possible inconsistencies or changes in the mental models they used to answer our individual
questions.
After each response was classified, we checked to see the extent to which their individual responses
could be generated by the consistent use of the same earth shape concept. On the basis of our
empirical data as well as from previous research in this area we derived a number of possible concepts
of the earth's shape and gravity. Then, for each question we generated the answers expected if the
children had used one of these concepts. For example, if the children used a sphere earth concept
consistently we expected them to say that the earth is round or spherical to Question 1, that you look
down to see the earth to Question 3, that there is no edge to the earth to Question 15, to draw a circle
to depict the earth in Question 11, and so on.
Once we derived the pattern of responses expected for each question for all concepts investigated, we
were able to determine the degree of correspondence between the expected and obtained responses to
the relevant questions. Children were assigned to a specific concept of the earth's shape if their
responses had no more than one deviation from the expected pattern and only if this deviation
occurred in a non-core item for that category. Children who appeared to use more than one concept to
answer the questions were placed in a mixed concept category. If children's responses could not be
explained by the use of one or more concepts, they were placed in a category called undetermined.
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Notice that we have adopted a fairly conservative criteria for classifying a child's concept of the earth.
If a child was using a consistent model that we did not understand, our procedure would probably place
the child's concept in the mixed or undetermined category. Information about the criteria used for
assigning concepts to children will be discussed in greater detail in the results section.
The scoring key originally constructed was used by two independent judges to score half of the data. It
was then modified in order to cover the full range of responses obtained. The data was rescored using
this modified scoring key. Agreement between the two independent judges at the end of the scoring
was generally high (94%). All disagreements were resolved after discussion.
Results
Earth Shape Concept
A total of 16 questions were asked in an effort to understand children's earth shape concept. The first
part of this section gives the theoretically important item level data and the later sections give data on
the children's concepts which were derived from the item data. The interview started with the
question, "What is the shape of the earth?" This was a factual question designed to show whether the
children had been exposed to the information that the earth is a sphere. The responses to this first
question appear in Table 1. Most of the third (17 out of 20) and fifth grade children (18 out of 20) said
that the earth is "round," but the majority of the first graders used the word "circle" to indicate the
shape of the earth (14 out of 20 responses). It is not possible to determine from children's responses to
this question alone whether the use of the term "circle" was related to a lexical difficulty (i.e., the
children used "circle" to mean "round" because they did not know the word "round"), or to a conceptual
confusion (i.e., they used the word "circle" because they thought that the earth is like a flat disc rather
than a sphere), or to both. Even the word "round" is ambiguous with respect to whether it refers to a
sphere or a disc. The unambiguous responses "sphere" or "round like a ball" were used rarely (only in 5
out of 60 responses).
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
Question 3 (Table 2) asked the children, "Which way do we look to see the earth?" an item originally
used by Nussbaum and Novak (1976). Many of the children (23/60) including the majority of the first
graders (12/20) said that you look "up" to see the earth. We do not know why so many children gave
this response. It is possible that they interpret looking out to the horizon as "looking up." This
response could also be interpreted as evidence for a "dual earth" concept. According to the dual earth
concept there are two earths: a flat one on which we live and a round one which is up in the sky.
[Insert Table 2 about here.]
Question 3 was followed up with the questions, "What is above the earth?", "What is below the earth?",
and "What is to the sides of the earth?" The responses to those questions were not very informative.
Most of the children said that "the sky" was above the earth, and that either "the sun or the moon" were
to the sides of the earth.
When asked to draw a picture of the earth (Question 11; Table 3), most of the children drew a circle
(54 out of 60). Again, because of the ambiguity of the shape represented by a drawn circle, it was not
possible to determine from this response alone whether the children were attempting to draw a
spherical earth or a disc earth. Two children drew an oval-like shape, while two others drew a straight
line at first but then changed to a circle when asked if this is how the earth would look like if they were
in a spacecraft. One child drew a circle and placed it in the middle of a square frame. Finally, one first
grader drew a rectangle. This was the only clear evidence of a non-circular flat mental model of the
earth's shape.
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[Insert Table 3 about here.]
In the next question (Question 12, Table 4) the children were asked to add the moon, stars, and sky to
their earth drawings. This item was designed to find out whether the children would place the solar
objects and the sky all around the earth or whether they would be faithful to their experience and place
them only above the earth. Quite a few of the children (24/60) drew the moon and stars above the
circle. About an equal number (26/60) placed the solar objects on all sides of the circle. However, 8
of those (mostly first graders) drew a horizontal line to depict the sky, revealing in that respect the
remnants of a naive concept of the earth. Finally, 8 children drew the moon and the stars inside the
circle. Initially this may seem puzzling but when the children were asked about their drawing they
stated that they meant to put the moon and stars on top of the circle, not inside it. These children
seemed to view the circle as representing the flat top of a round earth (round like a disc or like a
truncated sphere) with the moon and stars located directly above it.
[Insert Table 4 about here.]
The hypothesis that some children conceptualized the circle as the flat top of the earth was reinforced
by their responses to Question 13 which asked them to show where the people live with respect to
their earth drawing (Table 5). Practically all the children drew their people inside the circle (50 out of
60 responses), rather than on the perimeter of the circle where most adults draw them. Only two first
grade children drew a person standing on the top part of the circle's perimeter. Three children drew
their people on a straight line inside the circle giving some initial evidence for the belief that people live
inside the earth. Three more children drew a person on a straight line outside the circle revealing their
uncertainty as to whether people live on the sphere or not. Two of these children eventually changed
their minds and put their people inside the circle. The child who drew the rectangle put his person
inside the rectangle.
[Insert Table 5 about here.]
The children were also asked to show in their drawings where Champaign-Urbana and China
(Question 19) are located. Most children (47 out of 60) indicated that both places were inside the
circle. Some children said that China is on the other, non-visible, side of the earth, a response
consistent with the belief that the earth is a sphere (9 out of 60). One child said that China is outside
the circle, and another did not know where China was. The remaining 2 children did not know where
to place Champaign-Urbana and China.
In the next question, the experimenter showed the children a picture of a farm house in the middle of a
flat landscape and (if they had drawn a round earth) asked them to explain why "here the earth is flat
but before you made it round." A few children (3 out of 60) did not know how to answer this question,
others did not seem to recognize the flat/sphere conflict (Responses No. 2 & 4, in Table 6), while one
child changed from a round to a flat earth response (Response No. 3). Here is the protocol of the child
who changed from a round to a rectangular earth response.
[Insert Table 6 about here.]
Betsy (1st grade) [Response No. 3, change from round to rectangle]
E: How come here the earth is flat but before you made it round?
C: No response.
E: What's the real shape of the earth?
C: It's a circle.
E: How come it looks flat there?
C: It's a rectangle looking like that.
E: Yeah, so what's the real shape?
Vosniadou & Brewer
Concept of Earth's Shape - 13
C: It's an oval... it's like a rectangle ... no I mean (child points to her
original rectangle shape). It's like that.
E: I think you used the right word. That is a rectangle.
C: Child nods.
E: So is it round or is it kind of flat?
C: Flat.
Some children (27 out of 60) recognized the flat/sphere conflict and tried to explain it (responses No.
10 & 11). These children said that the earth is really round but appears flat when you are on it, or that
it appears flat because it is very big. Here are some characteristic responses:
Don (3rd grade) [Response No. 10, no explanation]
E: How come here the earth is flat but before you made it round?
C: The earth is actually moving around. It's flat, you know, like on some lands,
but it is not actually. I don't quite know how to explain it, but it's actually
round, but people can't tell. Unless they're up on the moon. It looks flat
but it's actually round.
Isaac (3rd grade) [Response No. 11, explanation]
E: How come here the earth is flat but before you made it round?
C: Well, here it looks like the earth is flat, but just that where we're at it's so
big, it looks flat.
Finally, a number of children gave responses indicating that they had an earth shape concept which was
not spherical. Some children (4 out of 60) said that the earth is round like a thick pancake (disc), that
people live inside the earth (14/60), that we live on flat pieces of land on the top of the earth (1/60), or
that there are two earths: a flat one on which we live and a round one which is up in the sky (4/60).
Here are examples of these response categories:
Brandy (1st grade) [Response No. 8, two earths]
E: How come the earth is flat but you made it round?
C: Because the earth is up in the sky and that's (house) down on the
earth.
Terina (5th grade) [Response No. 5, disc]
C: The earth is round but when you look at it, it is flat.
E: Why is that?
C: Because if you were looking around it would be round.
E: But what is the real shape of the earth? Is it round like a ball or is it
round like a thick pancake?
C: Round, like a thick pancake.
Matthew (1st grade) [Response No. 6, inside-the-sphere]
C: On the earth we have to have ground so we can plant trees and make
houses and plant flowers and make gardens.
E: But how come it looks flat here and round in this picture?
C: Because inside the world we have a whole big kind of like universe and
it's just all flat on the ground.
E: So is the earth round like a ball or is it sort of like a thick pancake?
C: It's round like a ball.
E: So where does the flat come in?
C: Inside, inside the countries.
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Subsequently; the children were asked the questions, "If you walked and walked for many days in a
straight line, where would you end up?"; "Would you ever reach the edge of the earth?" and the follow-
up question, "Is there an edge to the earth?" and "Could you fall off the edge of the earth?" The first
three questions were scored together in order to distinguish the children who thought that there is an
edge to the earth but it cannot be reached (because it is too far away, or there are oceans or high
mountains in between, etc.) from those who thought that there is no edge to the earth. The responses
to these questions appear in Tables 7 and 8.
[Insert Tables 7 & 8 about here.]
As Table 7 shows, 38 out of the 60 children said that the earth does not have an edge. Of these, only 22
were able to justify their responses. Here is an example of a justified response.
Charles (3rd grade) [Response No. 4 - no edge-justified]
E: If you walked for many days in a straight line, where would you end up?
C: On the other side of the earth. You'd come around to the side you were
on before. You'd go on the other side.
E: Would you ever reach the edge of the earth?
C: No.
Fourteen children (10 first graders) thought that there is an edge to the earth and said that people
could fall down from that edge (Responses No. 3, 4, Table 8). Here is an example of that type of
response:
Kristi (1st grade) [Response No. 3 - fall off]
E: If you walked and walked for many days in a straight line, where would
you end up?
C: You would end up in a different town.
E: Well, what if you kept on walking and walking?
C: In a bunch of different towns, states and then, if you were here and you
kept on walking here (child shows edge of circle), you walk right out of
the earth.
E: You'd walk right out of the earth? huh?
C: Yeah, because you just go that way and you reach the edge and you gotta
be kinda careful.
E: Could you fall off the edge of the earth?
C: Yes, if you were playing on the edge of it.
E: Where would you fall?
C: You'd fall on this edge if you were playing here. And you fall down on
other planets.
E: Down on other planets?
C: Yes. You could land on Mars. Like if you were on a spaceship, you
would go out this way and if you crashed you would be on Mars.
Apparently children like Kristi must have thought that the earth is flat on the top (like a disc or a
truncated sphere) and that it had an edge from which people could potentially fall off. Some children
clearly thought there was an edge to the earth but were reluctant to say that they would fall off because
they would try to hold on to the edge of the earth real tight!
Renae (1st Grade) [Response No. 3, fall off]
E: Could you ever reach the edge of the earth?
C: Yes.
E: Could you fall off the edge of the earth?
C: No.
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E: Why not?
C: Because once you fall off, you can't get back on.
E: Well, would you ever fall through?
C: No.
E: What if you could get back on, do you think you could fall off then?
C: Yes ... and if you took the edge of the thing, and you had one hand on it, you could
fall off easier.
E: So if you were hanging on the edge it would be easier to slip off, is that it?
C: Yea, but you can't hold on ... and if you were holding on to both hands
and you couldn't hold on and you tried to pull yourself back on and you had
your pinky on it and you couldn't hold on much longer, all you have to do is to hold
the whole hand on it.
A few children believed that there is an edge to the earth but that people are inside the earth and
therefore they cannot reach that edge or if they reach it they cannot fall off of it. Here is an example of
this response.
Matthew (1st grade) [Response No. 6, inside-the-sphere]
E: If you walked and walked for many days in a straight line where would you end up?
C: If we walked for a very long time we might end up at the end of the earth.
E: Would you ever reach the edge of the earth?
C: I don't think so.
E: Say we just kept walking and walking and we had plenty of food with us.
C: Probably.
E: Could you fall off the edge of the earth?
C: No. Because if we were outside of the earth we could probably fall off, but if we were
inside the earth we couldn't fall off.
E: You'd be walking inside the earth?
C: Yeah, I'd be walking on the countries.
E: Would you ever reach the edge of the earth?
C: If I had a rocket I could.
E: Is there an edge to the earth?
C: Yes.
E: So could you reach it if you walked long enough?
C: Well, if I walked and walked, let's say there is a space port down here, and I just
walked for days and days and days, I would get to the space port and I'd
probably get trained like for a rocket and I could probably reach that
edge with a rocket if I blasted off.
E: Could you walk to the edge of the earth?
C: No.
E: How come you can't walk to it, but you can take a spaceship to it?
C: Like if you went up in space and then you were going to come back down you would
reach the edge.
E: But if you were walking on the earth, could you reach the edge?
C: No, because you can't walk up in space.
E: So is there an edge to the earth?
C: Yes.
E: Can we walk over to the edge and just stand there and look?
C: Well, we can walk to a dead end.
E: What if we took one more step?
C: Well, if there was construction, you would fall into a hole.
Matthew seems to think that we are at the bottom of a hollow sphere, and that we cannot reach the
edge of the earth unless we take a spaceship.
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Finally, two children believed that there is an edge to the earth but that you cannot fall off it because
gravity will hold you down.
The last question designed to investigate the earth shape concept was Question 20, "Tell me in this
picture what is down here below the earth?" Most children mentioned the sky, the clouds or solar
objects. The older children were much more likely to use the word "space" than the younger children
(1/20, 5/20, and 8/20 for first, third and fifth grade respectively). Finally, a few of the first graders said
that there is "dirt," "ground," "grass," or "us" below the earth (6 out of 20 first grade children), indicating
that they possibly had a dual earth model.
[Insert Table 9 about here.]
Children's Concepts of the Earth's Shape
Children's responses to our individual questions revealed tremendous surface inconsistency. The same
child would say that the earth is round, a response consistent with a spherical concept, and yet answer
the question regarding the edge of the earth as if he or she believed that the earth is flat. These
inconsistencies became more pronounced when we compared responses to the factual versus the
generative questions. For example, 99% of the children said that the shape of the earth is either a
circle or round, but only 63% of those said that the earth does not have an end. And, while 94% of the
children drew a circle to indicate the shape of the earth, 38% said that you look "up" to see the earth.
These discrepancies showed that many children who had been exposed to the information that the
earth is a sphere were not able to understand this information in the way that the adults intended it.
Inconsistencies were not only observed between responses in the factual versus generative questions.
There were important discrepancies among children's responses to the different generative questions
themselves. For example, only 23% of the children's responses to the question about the earth's edge
were consistent with a spherical earth concept as compared to 45% spherical earth responses to the
question "What is down here below the earth?" (i.e., they said that there is sky, space or solar objects
below the earth).
Were the children truly inconsistent or could the apparent inconsistencies be explained by assuming
that children had constructed an alternate concept of the earth?
In order to find out whether children's seemingly inconsistent responses were internally consistent with
respect to these alternate concepts we devised the following methodology. For each identified
alternate earth shape concept (sphere, questionable sphere, inside the sphere, disk, dual earth, flat) we
generated the pattern of responses expected if the child had used that concept consistently. For
example, we assumed that if the children had used a consistent disc earth concept they would say that
the earth's shape is round or a circle, that you look down to see the earth, and that there is an edge to
the earth. These children should draw a circle to depict the earth and they should put the people,
Urbana-Champaign, and China inside the circle. They should be more likely than the sphere children
to place the moon and stars inside or on top of the circle and to say that there is ground or water below
it.
Once the pattern of responses for each earth shape concept was generated, it was used to determine
the degree of correspondence between the expected and obtained responses to the relevant earth shape
questions. The criteria for assigning children to a given concept were that they show no more than one
deviation from the expected pattern and that this deviation does not occur in the case of the "core"
items for that category. Core items were the items whose deviation could not be explained without
assuming that the children had formed a mental model which was inconsistent with the assumed earth
shape concept. Take, for example, the response "circle" to the question "What is the shape of the
earth?" This response could be given by a child who had formed a spherical earth mental model but
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who either did not know the word "sphere" or "round," or thought that the word "circle" means round.
This item could not therefore be a core item for the spherical earth concept. On the other hand, an
affirmative response to the question about the earth's edge raised significant doubts about whether a
child had a stable spherical earth concept, because it could not have been generated by a spherical
earth model. This item was therefore considered a "core" item for the spherical earth concept.
More information about the criteria adopted for placing children in the various earth shape concepts
and about the core items in each category is presented in Table 10 and will be discussed in greater
detail below. The following earth shape concepts were postulated and appear to have been used in a
consistent fashion by some of the children in our sample.
[Insert Table 10 about here.]
Sphere concept. Children were placed in this category if, and only if, they gave the pattern of
responses described in Table 10. More specifically we expected the children who made consistent use
of a sphere concept to say that the Earth is either "round" or "sphere" (Question 1), that we look
"down," "sideways" or "all around" to see the earth (Question 3), to draw a circle to indicate the earth's
shape (Question 11), to place the stars and the moon either above or all around their earth drawing
and to say that the sky is everywhere (Question 12), to draw the people (Question 13) and China and
Urbana (Question 19) inside the circle, or to indicate that China is on the other side of the spherical
earth, to understand and try to explain the flat/sphere conflict, although a complete explanation was
not deemed necessary (Question 14), to state that there is no end/edge to the earth because the earth
is round and therefore you come back to where you started (Questions 15/16), and finally to say that
below the earth is space or solar objects (Question 20).
All the children placed in the sphere concept category had this pattern of responses. The only
deviations occurred in Questions 1 and 3 which were not considered to be core items for this category.
More specifically, one child said "circle" to Question 1 instead of "round" or "sphere," and three children
said "up" instead of "down" to Question 3.
The following is a typical example of a child with a sphere concept.
Ethan (1st Grade)
E: What is the shape of the Earth?
C: It's the shape of a ball.
E: Which way do we look to see the Earth?
C: Down.
E: What is above the Earth?
C: Space.
E: What is below the Earth?
C: Space.
E: Can you draw a picture of the Earth?
(The child draws the picture shown in Figure 1.)
[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
E: Show me where the moon and stars go.
C: Well, the stars go all around it, and the moon could probably be up here. And here
could be the sun.
E: Now draw the sky.
C: The sky has no shape. You mean space. I can draw the sky around the Earth.
E: How come here the earth is flat but before you made it round? (The child is shown
the picture of the farm house on what appears to be a flat Earth.)
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C: Well the earth is so big it looks flat but it's round. If it's round and it's huge, people
see it as flat. I think the islands are flat, I think. I think the islands are a bit
curved but people don't notice it.
E: If you walked and walked for many days in a straight line, where would you end up?
C: Back where you started.
E: Would you ever reach the edge of the earth?
C: No, because gravity pulls you down.
E: Is there an edge to the earth?
C: No.
Inside-the-sphere concept. This category included children who seemed to use one of two types of
mental models: One was the mental model of a hollow sphere, and the other the mental model
originally identified by Nussbaum (1978) that the earth consists of two hemispheres; a lower
hemisphere on which people live and an upper hemisphere which consists of the sky covering the lower
hemisphere like a dome. It was not possible to always distinguish these two mental models from each
other. The pattern of expected responses for this concept appears in Table 10 and the individual
responses of the 10 children who met the criteria for placement in this category appear in Table 11.
[Insert Table 11 about here.]
All the children placed in this category said, on more than one response, that the earth is a sphere and
that we live inside it. One core item for placement in this category was the explanation of the
flat/sphere conflict in Question 14 from the point of view of an inside-the-sphere concept. All the
children in this category said that the earth looks round from the outside (i.e., from space) but it looks
flat to us because we are inside the earth. Another core item for this category was the response to
Question 15/16 about the end/edge of the earth. In response to this question, some children said that
there is an edge to the earth but it is on top of us and we cannot reach it, revealing a hollow earth
model. Other children said that there is no edge to the earth. These children apparently thought of
the earth as a circular surface enclosed at the edges by the sky and therefore without a true edge.
The children placed in this category gave a number of other responses consistent with the inside-the-
sphere concept. Five out of the 10 children in this category drew the stars and moon inside the circle
(Question 12), 3 drew the people on a flat line inside the circle (Question 13), and 5 said that the earth
is all around us when asked "Which way do we look to see the earth?" (Question 3). This response was
very rare in the children assigned to the other earth shape concepts. The only responses that were
inconsistent with the inside-the-sphere concept were the response "ground" to Question 20, "What is
here below the earth?" which was given by 2 children, and the response "circle" to Question 1, "What is
the shape of the earth?" which was given by 3 children.
Here is a typical example from the inside-the-sphere concept.
Veronica (3rd Grade)
Veronica drew the picture of the Earth shown in Figure 2.
[Insert Figure 2 about here.]
E: How come here the earth is flat but before you made it round?
C: Because you are on the ground and you make that picture like a shape and
you made it a square shape and if you'll look up it'll look like a rectangle or
something like that and if yotu go out of earth and go into space you'll see a
circle or round.
E: So what is the real shape of the earth?
C: Round.
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E: Why does it look flat?
C: Because you are inside the earth.
E: If you walked and walked for many days in a straight line, where would you
end up?
C: Somewhere in the desert.
E: What if you kept walking?
C: You can go to states and cities.
E: What if you kept on walking?
C: No response.
E: Would you ever reach the edge of the earth?
C: No. You would have to be in a spaceship if you're going to go to the end of
the earth.
E: Is there an edge to the earth?
C: No. Only if you go up.
E: Does anyone live here on the bottom of the Earth?
C: No, because they live in the states up here.
E: But could they live down here?
C: Yes.
E: Why wouldn't they fall off?
C: Because they are inside the Earth?
E: What do you mean inside?
C: They don't fall, they have sidewalks, things down like on the bottom.
E: Is the earth round like a ball or round like a thick pancake?
C: Round like a ball.
E: When you say that they live inside the earth, do you mean they live inside
the ball?
C: Inside the ball. In the middle of it.
Disk concept. The pattern of expected responses for the disc concept is shown in Table 10. The core
items for placement in this concept were the following: (a) child draws a circle to depict the earth in
Question 11, (b) explains the flat/sphere conflict in Question 14 by saying that the earth is round like a
pancake, not round like a ball, and (c) says that the earth has an end/edge (Questions 15/16). The
other criteria for this concept were that the child says that people can fall down from the edge of the
earth (Question 17), and that there is ground, or water below the earth (Question 20). Although a
number of children explained the flat/sphere conflict by saying that the earth is like a "thick pancake"
rather than "round like a ball," only one child met all criteria for inclusion in this concept. Here is an
example from this child's responses to our earth shape questions.
Jamie (3rd grade)
E: What is the shape of the earth?
C: Round.
E: Which way do we look to see the earth?
C: I don't know.
E: Well, think about it.
C: Probably in the sky.
E: Can you draw a picture of the earth? (Child draws the picture appearing in Figure 3.)
[Insert Figure 3 about here.]
E: How come here the earth is flat but before you made it round?
C: Just because I thought it was round.
E: So what do you think it is?
C: I think it is round.
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E: Then how come it looks flat here?
C: I don't know.
E: Maybe we'll come back to that. If you walked for many days in a straight
line where would you end up?
C: Probably in another planet.
E: Could you ever reach the end of the earth?
C: Yes, if you walked long enough.
E: Could you fall off that end?
C: Yes, probably.
At the end of the interview, the child was asked some questions over again.
E: Now I want to go back for just a moment and ask a couple of questions ...
What did you say the shape of the earth was?
C: Round.
E: And we said this is a house on earth and it looks ...
C: Flat.
E: Now, how can that be?
C: Maybe it's just flat.
E: Maybe it's just flat?
C: The earth.
E: Let's just take some of this (clay). Why don't you make the shape of the
earth with this?
C: You mean what I think it is?
E: Yes, whatever you think it is ...
(Child shapes up the clay like a disc)
E: Now, can people live here? (on top)
C: Yes.
E: Can they live under here? (bottom of disc)
C: No.
Rectangular earth concept. The expected pattern of responses for this concept is shown in Table 10.
There was only one child who held this concept. This child drew a rectangle to indicate the earth's
shape, placed the moon and stars on top of the rectangle and drew a horizontal line to indicate the sky.
This child also drew the people and placed Urbana and China inside the rectangle, said that there is an
edge to the earth from which people could fall down, and thought that there was ground and dirt below
the earth. An example from this child's responses is given below.
Donald (1st Grade)
E: What is the shape of the Earth?
C: I don't know.
E: Which way do we look to see the Earth?
C: Left.
E: What is above the Earth?
C: God...
E. Draw a picture of the Earth.
C: I don't know how it looks like. All I know is clouds. It's all blue up there.
A rectangle? I mean a long thing like this.
[Insert Figure 4 about here.]
E: This is a picture of a house sitting on the earth and here the earth is flat.
Do you think the earth is flat?
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C: Mine is too.
E: Show me where the people live.
C: In a house (draws house) on the Earth.
E: If you walked and walked for many days in a straight line, where would we
end up?
C: In Illinois.
E: What if we kept walking.
F: Past! I don't know!
E: Would you ever reach the edge of the earth?
C: He would.
E: Is there an edge to the Earth?
C: Yes.
E: Could you fall off the edge of the earth?
C: No. Because. Yes you will.
Dual earth concept. The expected pattern of responses for placement in this concept are shown in
Table 10. The responses of all the children who were placed in this category are shown in Table 12.
[Insert Table 12 about here.]
This concept covered two kinds of children: (a) four children who said explicitly in the course of
answering one of the questions that there are two earths (a flat one on which we live, and one round
one which is up in the sky), and (b) five children who did not explicitly state that there are two earths,
but answered our questions as if they believed so. Most of these children insisted that the earth is
round like a ball, not like a pancake, but they said that the earth has an end/edge (Questions 15/16),
from which people can fall down (Question 17), and that there is "ground," or "us" below the earth
(Question 20). These children also indicated either that people live on a flat line outside the circle
(Question 13) or drew the circle depicting the earth inside a square frame (Question 11). Finally, all
but one child in this category said that you look "up" to see the earth, a response consistent with the
dual earth concept.
Here is a characteristic example from this concept.
Darcy (3rd grade)
E: What is the shape of the earth?
C: Round.
E: How do you know the earth is round?
C: Because it looks like a ball.
E: Which way do we look to see the earth?
C: Up.
E: What is above the earth?
C: The sky.
E: What is below the earth?
C: I don't know.
E: What is to the sides of the earth?
C: Clouds.
E: Make a picture of the earth so that its real shape shows. (Child makes
drawing shown in Figure 5.)
[Insert Figure 5 about here.]
E: Now show me where the people live.
C: Child draws house at the border of the paper.
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E: Can you show me in your picture, where people live. ... Where in your
picture might people live, Darcy?
C: Down over here?
(Child draws another house along the same border.)
E: Here is a picture of a house. This house is on the earth isn't it?
E: How come here the earth is flat but before you made it round?
C: I don't know.
E: Any ideas at all? Why don't you think about it for a minute. Is the earth
really round?
C: No.
E: It's not really round. Well, what shape is it?
C: Yaa. It's round.
E: Then how come it looks flat here?
C: Because it's on the ground.
E: But why does that make it look flat?
C: Because the ground's flat.
E: But the shape of the earth is ...
C: Round.
E: Ok, we might come back to that some other time.
E: If you walked and walked for many days in a straight line where would you
end up?
C: I don't know.
E: Well think about it a minute.
C: On earth.
E: Would you ever reach the edge of the earth?
C: No.
E: Why not?
C: Because it's so high.
E: Because what's so high?
C: The earth.
E: The earth is so high?
E: Could you fall off the edge of the earth?
C: Yes.
E: You could fall off the edge? (Experimenter draws a person upside down.) Would
this person fall?
C: Yes.
E: Where would he fall?
C: Down on the ground.
Questionable sphere concept. All the children who were placed in this category had some difficulty
reconciling their perception of a flat earth with the information that the earth is a sphere, as can be
seen in Table 13. These children answered our questions as if they believed that the earth is a sphere
but their responses to Question 14, which required an explanation of the flat/sphere conflict, appeared
to reveal the presence of an assimilatory concept. For example, these children said that the earth is
round but people live on flat pieces of land, that it is like a truncated sphere or like a thick pancake.
Most of these children also deviated from the spherical earth concept in that they drew a horizontal
line to indicate the sky in Question 12. Some of these children could probably be assigned to a
"truncated sphere" or "thick pancake" concept if we had used a less strict set of criteria; for others it was
not possible to determine exactly what concept of the earth they had, if any.
[Insert Table 13 about here.]
Mixed concepts. This group included 10 children with mixed patterns of responses for which no
consistent concept could be identified. Five of these children insisted that the earth is round but
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deviated from the sphere earth concept first in that they all said that there is an edge to the earth and
second in that they gave at least one of the following responses: said "circle" to Question 1, said "up" to
Question 3, used a horizontal line to indicate the sky, or drew the moon and stars inside the circle.
Two children gave all of the above mentioned responses but said there is no edge to the earth. Finally,
two children gave responses more consistent with the inside the sphere concept except that they said
that there is an edge to the earth from which one can fall off. One of these children deviated from the
inside-the-sphere concept in other respects as well. This child said that there is ground or dirt below
the earth (Question 20) and mentioned that when people fall off the edge of the earth they fall on the
ground below, a response consistent with the dual earth concept. It is possible that this child and some
of the other children did not have an internally consistent concept of the earth's shape. For others it is
possible that they had a consistent concept which we were not able to identify.
Frequency of earth shape concepts. Table 14 shows the frequency of the identified earth shape
concepts by grade. As can be seen, there is a developmental progression of the concepts held by these
children. Most first grade children held a dual earth concept or mixed concepts. Most of the third and
fifth grade children held sphere, questionable sphere or inside-the-earth concepts.
[Insert Table 14 about here.]
Gravity
Children's understanding of gravity was investigated by asking two series of questions. In the first
series the children were asked, "Does anyone live here at the bottom of the Earth?" (Question 20a),
then they were shown the drawing of a person standing upside down at the bottom of a circle meant to
depict the earth (see Table 15), and were asked, "Would this person fall?" (Question 20bb), and then
"why" or "why not?"
[Insert Table 15 about here.]
About half of the children at grade 1 and one-quarter of the children at grades 3 and 5 gave responses
indicating that they had a naive concept of gravity according to which objects fall down within a single
frame of reference. Most of these children said that people cannot live at the bottom of the earth and
that the man would fall. The second series of gravity questions originally used by Nussbaum and Novak
(1976) were asked with respect to a ball held by the man at the bottom of the Earth (Table 16). The
children were asked, "If this person had a ball in his hand and dropped it, where would the ball go?"
(Question 20bc) and "Draw the direction of the ball." Only 27 children gave the correct response to
this category (4/20 first graders, 12/20 third graders and 11/20 fifth graders). The remaining children
gave various incorrect responses.
[Insert Table 16 about here.]
The following are some examples from the responses of children who had a naive concept of gravity.
Betsy's (1st Grade) (Dual earth concept)
E: Would this person fall?
C: Yes.
E: If this person had a ball in his hand and dropped it, where would the ball
go?
C: Down here (shows the ball falling off the earth).
E: Why?
C: Cause. The boy ain't hanging on to it tight.
E: Why would it fall there?
C: I don't know.
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E: Tell me in this picture what is down here below the earth?
C: Grass.
Amanda (1st Grade) (Dual earth concept)
E: Does anyone live here at the bottom of the earth?
C: No. Because it would probably be dangerous for living there.
E: Why would it be dangerous?
C: Because it would be the edge of the earth and if a little kid was outside and
nobody was watching him they could fall.
E: Where would they fall?
C: Into space.
E: Where would they fall?
C: Probably in other planets.
Luther (5th Grade) (Inside-the-sphere concept)
E: Does anyone live here at the bottom of the earth?
C: No.
E: Why?
C: Because it's too hot. They would burn up.
E: Would they fall off?
C: No.
E: Why not?
C: Because you can't come to the edge of it to fall off. But you can get off the
earth with rockets, because they go through the atmosphere.
E: Would this person fall (draws person standing upside down at the bottom of
the earth)?
C: No.
E: Why not?
C: Because there is no atmosphere. He'd just float around.
E: If this person had a ball in his hand and dropped it where would the ball
go?
C: It would just float up.
E: Why?
C: Because there is no atmosphere or gravity.
Fifteen children said that the man standing at the bottom of the earth would not fall (Table 15). The
proportion mentioning "gravity" as an explanation for this response increased with age (2 first graders,
5 third graders and 8 fifth graders). Here is an example of that type of response.
Rich (5th Grade) (Sphere concept)
E: Does anyone live here at the bottom of the earth?
C: No.
E: Why not?
C: It's too cold. Some animals do.
E: Would they fall off?
C: No.
E: Why not?
C: Because there's an atmosphere around the earth.
E: Would this person fall (experimenter draws person upside down)?
C: No.
E: Why not?
C: Cause, well, he can't because of gravity.
E: If this person had a ball in his hand and dropped it, where would the ball
go?
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C: (Shows ball going toward earth) Because the gravity forces it down.
E: Tell me in this picture what is down here below the earth?
C: Space.
We placed the children in six gravity concepts outlined in Table 17. The children who gave correct
responses to both gravity questions were placed in the concept "correct gravity." We did not assume
that these children had a sophisticated understanding of gravity, but only an understanding of gravity
enough to understand that people at the bottom of the earth will not fall off. The concept "Gravity-
inside-the-sphere" was meant to capture the children who said that people can live at the bottom of the
earth to the verbal question (apparently interpreting "bottom of the earth" to mean the lower part
inside the earth) but when they saw the drawing of the man standing upside down outside the earth
they said that the man would fall down.
[Insert Table 17 about here.]
The children who said that the man would not fall but that the ball would fall were placed in the
category "mixed gravity," while the children who said that both the man and the ball would fall down,
away from the earth were placed in the "naive gravity" concept. Table 18 shows the frequency of
responses to these concepts as a function of grade. As expected most first graders had a naive concept
of gravity and the probability of having a correct gravity concept increased with age.
[Insert Table 18 about here.]
Relationships Between Earth Shape and Gravity Concepts
Table 19 shows the relationship between earth shape and gravity concepts. As expected, the probability
of being assigned to the "Gravity" concept was far greater for the children whose earth shape
conceptions were closer to the sphere concept (sphere, questionable sphere, inside-the-sphere) as
compared to those who were not (dual-earth, rectangular earth, disk).
[Insert Table 19 about here.]
Two children assigned to the sphere earth concept were not assigned to the "gravity" concept category.
Apparently, these children believed that the earth is a sphere but thought that people live only on the
top of it. On the other hand, there were a number of children who knew that people do not fall off
from the bottom of the earth, but had questionable sphere, inside-the-sphere, or mixed earth shape
concepts. Apparently, knowledge about gravity is not a sufficient condition for having a sphere earth
shape concept.
Discussion
Consistency vs. Fragmentation
The results of this study showed that most of the children used a well defined and consistent earth
shape concept to answer our questions but that this concept was not always the sphere concept. Only
18 of the 60 children investigated were found to use a sphere earth concept consistently and two of
these children thought that people live only at the top of the sphere. Neither was it the case that the
children used a naive concept of a flat earth totally uncontaminated by adult/scientific notions. Only
one child in our sample did not say that the earth is round or a circle. Most of the children used
concepts of the earth which showed a combination of naive and scientific views. We identified three
clear assimilatory concepts: the dual earth, the disc earth and the inside-the-sphere concepts. The
children who had a dual earth concept believed that there are two earths, a round one which is up in
the sky and a flat one on which people live. The children with a disc concept thought that the earth is
both flat and round and that it has an edge. Finally, some children believed that the earth is round like
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a sphere but that people live inside the sphere. There were two variations of this inside-the-sphere
concept: In one, the earth was conceptualized to be a hollow sphere with people living deep inside it.
In the other, the earth was thought to consist of two hemispheres; the lower one on which people lived
and the top one which consisted of the sky covering the lower hemisphere like a transparent dome.
Ten children (mostly third and fifth graders) were placed in a questionable sphere category. These
children were consistent in answering almost all our generative questions as if they believed that the
earth is a sphere but their responses to the explanatory question regarding the flat/sphere conflict
(Question 14) revealed various misconceptions about the earth's shape. Some of these children said
that the earth is like a truncated sphere, others thought that the earth is like a thick pancake, and
others simply said that people live on flat pieces of land. It was clear that these children had particular
difficulty in reconciling their perceptual experience of a flat earth with the information that the earth is
round.
The remaining nine children (seven were first graders) responded to our questions sometimes in ways
consistent with a sphere earth concept, and other times in ways consistent with a disc or an inside-the-
sphere concept. We do not know at this point whether these children were genuinely inconsistent or
had a consistent concept of the earth's shape which we could not identify. In follow-up studies already
in progress we ask additional generative questions and have children select physical models and
construct models from playdough in an effort to better identify their conceptual knowledge. It should
be noted that our results for consistent classifications may be underestimates since with our
methodology measurement error will lead to actually consistent children being classified as
inconsistent.
The success in identifying consistent concepts for the great majority of the children in our sample
shows that children's conceptual knowledge is not as fragmented and unconnected as some theorists
have argued (e.g., di Sessa, 1988; Solomon, 1983). It appears that children try to synthesize the
information they receive from their everyday experience and from adults in a meaningful and internally
consistent way. Children's synthetic attempts are not different in kind from scientists' attempts to
construct or modify theories and in this respect children are like scientists.
It could be objected that some of the concepts we identified (particularly the assimilatory ones) may
not be precompiled but may spring from mental models constructed by the children on the spot on the
basis of relevant information in their global theories. In our view this issue is not crucial for our
position. Whether precompiled or not, the use of relatively stable knowledge structures indicates that
children are (a) interested and capable of connecting their knowledge fragments and (b) sensitive to
the internal consistency of their synthetic attempts. Nevertheless, the finding that we would not identify
a consistent earth shape concept for some children in our sample suggests that there may be important
individual differences with respect to such theory construction, a topic which will be interesting to
pursue in future work.
The Robustness of Naive Concepts
Although the adult culture provides massive exposure to the idea that the earth is a sphere, some
children come to believe that the earth is round like a disc, that people live inside the earth or that
there are two earths. There is no doubt that such assimilatory concepts of the earth's shape are child
generated. The question is, why do children need to construct such concepts of the earth's shape?
One of the reasons why children may construct assimilatory concepts is because they find it very
difficult to give up the idea that the earth is not flat. Assimilatory concepts succeed in reconciling the
phenomenal experience of a flat earth with the adult information that the earth is a sphere. All the
assimilatory concepts we have identified are based on the belief that the earth is both flat and round at
the same time. The children with the dual earth concept believe that there are two earths, one round,
and one flat. The children with a disc concept interpret round to mean round but flat; and the children
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with the inside-the-sphere concept believe that the earth is a sphere but that people live on flat ground
inside the earth. There would be no reason for children to form these systematic and robust
misconceptions if they did not believe that the earth is flat in the first place.
Assimilatory concepts show that children are not "blank slates" with respect to the earth's shape when
they receive the information that the earth is a sphere but that they have constructed an initial, naive
concept of the earth according to which the earth is flat. This naive concept is difficult to give up
otherwise the children in our sample would have readily replaced it with the sphere concept instead of
forming an assimilatory one. More direct confirmation of the hypothesis that children start by forming
an initial naive concept of a flat earth has been obtained in our studies of preschool children
(Vosniadou & Brewer, in preparation) and in our cross-cultural work (Brewer, Herdrich, &
Vosniadou, submitted; Samarapungavan & Vosniadou, in preparation; Vosniadou & Brewer, in press).
Naive and Assimilatory Concepts are Embedded Within Global Theories
Children's concepts of the earth are not composed only of the belief that the earth is flat. An
examination of the specific assimilatory concepts we have uncovered shows that they represent
attempts on the part of the children to synthesize not one but a number of discrete beliefs about the
earth.
Some of these beliefs are the belief that the ground does not extend indefinitely but has an edge, and
that people can fall off from that edge, that there is ground or water all the way down below the earth,
that people live on the flat top of the earth, that the sky is only on top of the earth, and that things fall
down when you drop them.
The belief that the earth has an end/edge is found in the naive concept and is retained in the disc and
the inside-the-earth concepts but not the sphere and the questionable sphere concepts. The children
who have sphere or questionable sphere concepts have understood that the earth does not have an
end/edge and that if one were to walk for many days one would come back to where one started.
The belief that people can fall off the earth's edge differentiates the inside the earth concept from the
naive and disc concept. The children with the inside-the-sphere concept believe that there is an edge to
the earth but think that we cannot fall down from it either because the edge is too high up and people
cannot reach it, or because the earth is enclosed by the sky. Another belief that differentiates the
sphere, questionable sphere and inside-the-sphere children from the other children is the belief that
the earth is suspended in space. The children who hold a naive concept appear to believe that there is
ground or water all the way down below the earth. Finally, there is the belief that things fall down
when you drop them which differentiates the children who have a sphere earth concept with gravity
from the ones who do not know about gravity and think that people live only at the top of the earth.
We think that these ontological beliefs are constructed by the children on the basis of their everyday
experience under the constraints of their global theories. Naive and assimilatory concepts are
generated out of these ontological beliefs. In addition to a theory of ontology children seem to also
have an epistemological theory which further constrains their concepts. Part of this epistemological
theory is the belief that (a) that ontological beliefs represent the true state of affairs about the world
and (b) adults are usually right.
If children did not believe that their ontological beliefs represent the way the world really is there
would be no reason to form assimilatory concepts of the earth. They would simply change their beliefs
and adopt the adult model that the earth is a sphere. The formation of assimilatory concepts indicates
that children are operating under the epistemological constraint that their ontological beliefs are
fundamentally correct. Assimilatory concepts also presuppose the belief that adults are right. If
children did not believe that adults are right they would have no difficulty rejecting the adult
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information and retaining their original naive views. When children construct an assimilatory concept
they try to retain their ontological beliefs in a way that does not contradict adult teachings.
In summary, we think that the genesis of an assimilatory concept can be conceptualized in the following
way. When children read in a book or hear from an adult that the earth is a sphere they do not want to
believe that the adult information is wrong but find it hard to reconcile it with their ontological beliefs.
Because children believe that their ontological beliefs represent the true state of affairs about the world
they are not likely to question them. Rather, they believe that they have misunderstood what the adults
really mean when they say that the earth is round. In trying to interpret the adult information in a way
that does not contradict their ontological beliefs children construct assimilatory concepts or develop
unassimilated internally inconsistent concepts.
Theory Articulation vs. Theory Restructuring
Conceptual change has often been conceptualized in terms of the differentiation and hierarchical
integration of children's initial conceptual structures. This proposal put forward originally by Werner
(1948) has found many proponents in recent years (Carey, 1985; Chi, in press; Keil, 1979, 1983; Smith,
Carey, & Wiser, 1985), although there are important differences in the way differentiation and
hierarchical integration are conceptualized by different researchers. For example, Keil (1979, 1983)
sees differentiation as the articulation of existing structures whereas according to Carey and her
colleagues (Carey, 1985; Smith, Carey, & Wiser, 1985), differentiation involves theory change.
For some concepts, in some domains, restructuring may be achieved through the differentiation or
coalescence of existing conceptual structures. However, the change from a concept that the earth is flat
to a concept that the earth is a sphere cannot be accounted for in terms of differentiation or
coalescence. Neither can it be accounted for by a model such as the one proposed by Chi (in press) in
which two separate and previously unconnected microstructures become hierarchically organized.
Assuming that the information that the earth is a sphere is originally stored as a separate
microstructure Chi's model can explain how the dual earth assimilatory concept is formed, but it
cannot explain how children generate the disc or the inside-the-sphere assimilatory concepts.
It could be argued that the change from a flat earth concept to a round earth concept does not require
the articulation or the restructuring of an existing theoretical structure but that it simply involves the
replacement of the property "flat" with the property "round." This position does not explain why
children find it so difficult to make the change from the flat to the round earth concept neither does it
explain the formation of assimilatory concepts.
It is important to note that when children change to a sphere earth shape concept they have not lost the
information that in the observed, everyday, world the ground is flat. What they have done is to change
their interpretation of this observation from one according to which the earth is flat one according to
which to the earth is a sphere. This change in explanatory framework is an important characteristic of
theory restructuring.
Restructuring via Assimilation
Although our data is cross-sectional and not longitudinal the progression of earth shape concepts we
have obtained from the younger to the older children provides us with interesting information
regarding the processes involved in theory restructuring. First, the finding that the younger children in
our sample were more likely to form dual earth concepts or hold internally inconsistent concepts
suggests that as children are first exposed to the information that the earth is round they are likely to
accept it as a fact and store it as separate structure, in a way similar to that described by Chi (in press).
Second, the presence of the disc and inside-the-earth concepts shows that when children realize the
contradiction between the two pieces of information they try to resolve it by assimilating the
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information that the earth is a sphere to their existing structures. As described earlier this process of
assimilation results from changing some but not all of the ontological beliefs that give rise to a naive
concept of the earth while at the same time trying to synthesize them into a coherent and internally
consistent whole.
Accommodation, or restructuring, is the last step in this long, slow process of knowledge acquisition. It
is achieved when most of the ontological beliefs that give rise to the naive concept have been replaced
by a different explanatory framework. The explanatory framework that modifies the relevant
ontological beliefs provides the basis for forming a domain-specific theory of astronomy.
The finding that the restructuring of a naive concept is a slow and gradual one does not agree with the
position that theory change involves Gestalt-like switches which has been put forward by Kuhn (1962).
The position that theory change involves a sudden and dramatic insight has been criticized by
philosophers of science (Laudan, 1984; Toulmin, 1972). In recent years Kuhn has modified his position
considerably (Kuhn, 1982) but has not altogether rejected the notion that restructuring involves a
sudden insight, particularly in the case of the historian of science who is trying to understand an earlier
theory radically different in its explanatory framework from the one they currently hold.
It could be argued that in the domain of astronomy children are in some respects in a position
analogous to that of a historian of science, in that they need to understand a conceptual system which is
radically different from their naive conceptions of the cosmos. To the extent that we could generalize
from our study of the concept of the earth's shape, our results suggest that theory change is a slow and
gradual process and not one that is achieved in a sudden Gestalt-switch fashion.
It is not clear at this point why children find it so difficult to change their naive concepts. There are a
number of possibilities which need to be examined in follow-up studies. As was mentioned earlier,
children do not seem to question the truth of their ontological beliefs spontaneously. In that respect,
ontological beliefs are not like the hypotheses or assumptions of a particular scientific theory but more
like the unquestionable assumptions and presuppositions defining the research paradigm within which
a scientist operates. In order to restructure their naive conceptions, children need to be provided with
enough reasons to question their ontological beliefs and with a different explanatory framework to
replace the one they have constructed on the basis of their everyday experience. Unfortunately, the
kind of instruction children receive during the elementary school years does not do that (Vosniadou,
1988, in preparation).
Differences With Piaget's Theory
We have argued that a theory of conceptual change involves not only the articulation of existing
theoretical structures but also their restructuring. The kind of restructuring we have described can be
conceptualized as requiring the emergence of a domain-specific theory of astronomy out of a global
theory or the replacement of one domain-specific theory with another (if children's naive and
assimilatory concepts are assumed to emerge out of domain-specific conceptual structures). The
theoretical framework which we have described also allows the possibility for global restructurings to
occur when most of the assumptions associated with a global theory are replaced with a different
explanatory framework.
Our differences with Piaget's theory is not on the issue of global vs. domain-specific restructuring but
rather on the issue of how restructuring is achieved. We think that both domain-specific and global
restructurings can be accounted for in terms of differences in explanatory framework, analogous to
theory changes in the history of science, rather than in qualitative differences in children's capacity to
think in terms of extensional logic.
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Methodological Issues
Last, but not least, this paper makes a contribution towards a methodology which can lead from
children's individual responses to the concepts that underlie them and which can be used not only in
the domain of astronomy but in most other domains.
A crucial aspect of this methodology is the construct of the mental model. The notion of the mental
model has been used extensively in recent work in cognitive science (Gentner & Stevens, 1983;
Johnson-Laird, 1983), but without making clear how mental models are related to concepts and
whether they are meant to represent a structural or a procedural component of the human cognitive
system. In our theoretical framework we treat mental models as products of the procedural
component, in other words as mental representations which are generated on the spot out of the
existing conceptual structures in order to deal with a particular problem or in order to answer a
question. As such, mental models can provide important information about the conceptual structures
from which they are generated.
Of methodological interest is also the procedure we developed for looking at the agreement between
the obtained responses to the individual questions and those derived a priori on the basis of the
hypothesized mental modes. This procedure can provide information about the degree to which
children have formed internally consistent concepts.
Finally, the construct of the generative question is an important one. Generative questions are the
kinds of questions t at differentiate between two competing mental models. In this study generative
questions enabled us to differentiate responses consistent with a naive concept from those consistent
with a sphere concept. We believe that similar generative questions can be constructed in other
domains to differentiate among different possible conceptions of the same phenomena.
Conclusions
We have argued that children form a naive concept of the earth according to which the earth is flat.
The process of restructuring the naive concept of a flat earth to the currently accepted concept of a
spherical earth is a slow and gradual one, and one that typically gives rise to intermediate assimilatory
concepts. Assimilatory concepts are formed because children try to reconcile certain fundamental
ontological beliefs with the information coming from adults that the earth is a sphere. The presence of
these assimilatory concepts confirms the hypothesis that children's concept of the earth is embedded
within children's ontological and epistemological theories, and that changing this concept requires a
kind of theory restructuring which is analogous to radical theory change in the history of science.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Drawing of the Earth, Sun, Moon and Stars by Ethan, Grade 1 (Sphere Concept)
Figure 2. Drawing of the Earth, Sun, Moon, and Stars by Veronica, Grade 3 (Inside-the-Sphere
Concept)
Figure 3. Drawing of the Earth, Sun, Moon, and Stars by Jamie, Grade 3 (Disc Concept)
Figure 4. Drawing of the Earth, Sun, Moon, and Stars by Donald, Grade 1 (Rectangular Earth
Concept)
Figure 5. Drawing of the Earth, Sun, Moon, and Stars by Darcy, Grade 3 (dual Earth Concept)
Table 1
Frequency of Responses to Question 1, "What is the shape of the earth?"
Grade
Response 1 3 5 Total
1. Don't know 1 0 0 1
2. Round 2 17 18 37
3. Circle 14 2 0 16
4. Round like a
ball or sphere 3 1 1 5
5. Oval 0 0 1 1
Total 20 20 20 60
Table 2
Frequency of Responses to Question 3, "Which way do we look to see the earth?"
Grade
Response 1 3 5 Total
1. Down 2 6 7 15
2. Up 12 6 5 23
3. Sideways 3 2 2 7
4. Everywhere,
all around 2 5 5 12
5. To the back or
to the front 1 1 1 3
Total 20 20 20 60
Table 3
Frequency of Responses to Question 11, "Can you draw a picture of the earth?"
Grade
Response 1 3 5 Total
1. Circle 15 20 19 54
2. Rectangle 1 0 0 1
3. Circle within
swuare frame 1 0 0 1
4. Oval 1 0 1 2
5. Straight line
changed to
circle 2 0 0 2
Total 20 20 20 60
Table 4
Frequency of Responses to Question 12, "Now on this drawing, show me where the
moon and stars go. ""Now draw the sky."
Grade
Response 1 3 5 Total
1. Moon and stars above circle
horizontal line for sky. 3 4 2 9
2. Moon and stars above circle, no
horizontal line. 2 6 5 13
3. Moon and stars all around circle,
horizontal line. 3 3 0 6
4. Moon and stars all around circle, no
horizontal line. 3 6 9 28
5. Moon and stars inside circle, no
horizontal line. 3 1 4 8
6. Moon and stars above circle,
horizontal line at bottom of
circle. 2 0 0 2
7. Moon and stars all around circle and
horizontal line at bottom of
circle. 2 0 0 2
8. Other 2 0 0 2
Total 20 20 20 60
Table 5
Frequency of Responses to Question 13, "Show me where the people live."
Grade
Response 1 3 5 Total
1. Inside the circle 15 17 18 50
2. Standing on the perimeter
of the circle 2 0 0 2
3. On straight line outside
the circle 1 0 0 1
4. As above, but changed after
questioning to inside the
circle 1 1 0 2
5. On flat line inside the
circle 0 1 2 3
6. Inside rectangle 1 0 0 1
7. Missing 0 1 0 1
Total 20 20 20 60
Table 6
Frequency of Responses to Question 14, "How come here the earth is flat but before
you made it round?"
Grade
Response 1 3 5 Total
1. Not applicable. (Child
thinks the earth is flat.) 1 0 0 1
2. Don't know/no response 1 0 0 1
3. Changed from round earth to
rectangle earth 1 0 0 1
4. Child appears not to
recognize the conflict 2 0 0 2
5. The earth is round like
a disc 1 3 0 4
6. The earth looks round but
inside it is flat 3 5 6 14
7. The earth is round but we
live on flat piece(s) on
the top 0 1 0 1
8. There are two earths 2 2 0 4
9. The earth is round but we
live on flat pieces of land 1 0 2 3
10. Child insists that the earth
is round, recognizes conflict,
cannot explain it 5 6 9 20
11. Child gives an adequate
explanation 2 3 2 7
12. Other 1 0 1 2
Total 20 20 20 60
Table 7
Frequency of Responses to Questions 15 & 16, "If you walked and walked for many
days in a straight line, where would you end up? Would you ever reach the edge of
the earth?" and "Is there an edge to the earth?"
Grade
Response 1 3 5 Total
1. Yes, there is an end/edge 12 4 0 16
2. Yes, there is an end/edge
but we cannot reach it
because we are inside the
earth 2 2 2 6
3. No end/edge and no
explanation 4 4 7 15
4. No end/edge; you come back
to where you started 2 5 8 15
5. No end/edge because the
earth is round 0 4 3 7
6. No end/edge but the earth
is up on the sky 0 1 0 1
Total 20 20 20 60
Table 8
Frequency of Responses to Question 176, "Could you fall off the edge of the earth?"
Grade
Response 1 3 5 Total
1. Don't know, or no response 2 0 0 2
2. Not applicable (there is
no end/edge) 5 10 17 32
3. Yes, you can fall off 9 3 0 12
4. Yes, you will fall on the ground
(the ground being underneath
the earth) 1 1 0 2
5. No (and no explanation) 1 1 1 3
6. No, you are inside the
sphere 1 2 1 4
7. No, gravity will hold you 1 0 1 2
8. Other 0 3 0 3
Total 20 20 20 60
Table 9
Frequency of responses to Question 20, "Tell me in this picture what is down here
below the earth?"
Grade
Response 1 3 5 Total
1. Don't know 4 0 0 4
2. Sky, atmosphere, clouds 4 6 3 13
3. Solar Objects 5 7 6 18
4. Space, nothing 1 5 8 14
5. Dirt, ground, grass, land,
"us" 6 1 2 9
6. Water 0 1 1 2
Total 20 20 20 60
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Table 14
Frequency of Earth Shape Concepts as a Function of Grade
Grade
Earth Shape
Concepts 1 3 5 Total
1. Sphere 2 8 10 20
2. Questionable
sphere 1 3 6 10
3. Inside the
sphere 2 4 4 10
4. Disc 0 1 0 1
5. Dual earth 7 2 0 9
6. Rectangle 1 0 0 1
7. Mixed 7 2 0 9
Total 20 20 20 60
Table 15
Frequency of Responses to the Questions, "Does anyone live here at the bottom of
the Earth?" (20a), "Can this man live here at the bottom of the Earth" (20ba) (see
figure) and "Why wouldn't he fall?" (20ba)
Grade
Responses 1 3 5 Total
1. Yes, people can live at the bottom
of the earth. This man can live
there. He wouldn't fall because
of gravity.
2. Yes, people can live at the bottom
of the earth. This man can live
there and he wouldn't fall. No
explanation.
3. No, people cannot live at the bottom
of the earth because it's cold,
there is an ocean, etc. But
if they did they wouldn't fall.
This man would not fall.
4. Yes, people live at the bottom of
the earth but this man would not
because he is upside down.
5. No, people cannot live at the bottom
of the earth because they would fall.
This man would fall.
6. Other or Missing.
2 5 8 15
2 4 2 8
1 5 5 11
5 5 4 14
6 1 0 7
4 0 1 5
Total 20 20 20 60
Table 16
Frequency of Responses to the Question 20bc, "If this person had a ball in his hand
and dropped it, where would the ball go? Draw the direction of the ball."
Grade
Responses 1 3 5 Total
1. Toward Earth
(correct gravitiy) 4 12 11 27
2. It would float around
in space 1 1 3 5
3. Toward Earth, but Earth
is flat line under circle 0 0 1 1
4. Away from earth
(up/down gravity) 13 7 5 25
5. Ground 2 0 0 2
Total 20 20 20 60
Table 17
Gravity Concepts
Questions 20a, 20bb Question 20bc
People can live at
the bottom of Earth. The
man would not fall down.
The ball would fall
toward Earth
2. Gravity inside
the earth
3. Mixed gravity
Naive
4. gravity
5. Undetermined
6. Don't know or
missing
Yes people could live at
the bottom of the sphere,
but this man would fall
or float in space because
he is upside down.
People can live at the
bottom of the Earth. The
man would not fall down.
People cannot live at the
bottom of the Earth. Man
would fall down
Not sure if the man is on
Earth or not. If yes, he
wouldn't fall.
Ball would fall
away from the Earth
The ball would fall
away from the Earth
The ball would fall
away from Earth
Not sure
Concepts
Correct
1. gravity
Table 18
Frequency of Responses to Gravity Concepts
Grade
Gravity
concepts 1 3 5 Total
1. Correct gravity 4 12 11 27
2. Gravity inside
the earth 5 5 4 14
3. Mixed 1 2 4 7
4. Naive
gravity 8 1 1 10
5. Undetermined 1 0 0 1
6. Don't know or
missing 1 0 0 1
Total 20 20 20 60
Table 19
Relationships Between Earth Shape and Gravity Concepts
Earth Shape Gravity Concepts
concepts
Correct Inside Mixed Naive Undetermined
gravity gravity gravity gravity DNK
Sphere 16/20 0 1/20 2/10 1/20
Questionable
sphere 6/10 3/10 1/10 0 0
Inside the
earth 3/10 3/10 3/10 1/10 0
Disc 0 1/1 0 0 0
Dual earth 0 5/9 0 3/9 1/9
Rectangular
earth 0 0 0 1/1 0
Mixed 2/9 2/9 2/9 3/9 0
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